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ABSTRACT 
 
What’s Best for Women: 
Gender Based Taxation, Wage Subsidies or Basic Income?* 
 
We use a microeconometric model of household labour supply in order to evaluate, with 
Italian data, the behavioural and welfare effects of gender based taxation (GBT) as compared 
to other policies based on different optimal taxation principles. The comparison is interesting 
because GBT, although technically correct, might face implementation difficulties not shared 
by other policies that in turn might produce comparable benefits. The simulation procedure 
accounts for the constraints implied by fiscal neutrality and market equilibrium. Our results 
support to some extent the expectations of GBT’s proponents. However it is not an 
unquestionable success. GBT induces a modest increase of women’s employment, but 
similar effects can be attained by universal subsidies on low wages. When the policies are 
evaluated in terms of welfare, GBT ranks first among single women but for the whole 
population the best policies are subsidies on low wages, unconditional transfers or a 
combination of the two. 
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* Part of the empirical exercise illustrated in this paper is based on the results of a project financed by 
the Compagnia di San Paolo during the period 2004-10. For preparing the dataset used in the 
estimation and simulation of the microeconometric model we used EUROMOD (Ver. 27a). EUROMOD 
is a tax-benefit microsimulation model for the European Union that enables researchers and policy 
analysts to calculate, in a comparable manner, the effects of taxes and benefits on household incomes 
and work incentives for the population of each country and for the EU as a whole. EUROMOD was 
originally designed by a research team under the direction of Holly Sutherland at the Department of 
Economics in Cambridge, UK. It is now developed and updated at the Microsimulation Unit at ISER 
(University of Essex, UK). 
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1. Introduction 
Gender based taxation (GBT), in the form of lower marginal tax rates for 
women, has recently been proposed by Alesina and Ichino (A&I).1 According to the 
authors, GTB would be the best policy in order to improve women’s status in the labour 
market and within the family: in particular their participation rate and income would 
increase; these effects might also make the policy self-financed thanks to the increase in 
tax revenue due to higher tax rates for men and higher income for women. The proposal 
is based on a classical result of second-best optimal taxation theory and on the empirical 
evidence that the wage elasticity of labour supply is lower for women than for men.2 
Ramsey’s inverse elasticity rule then suggests that women’s labour income should be 
taxed at lower marginal rates than men’s.3  A&I, on the basis of their theoretical model 
with imputed values for the key parameters, conclude that marginal tax rates for women 
should be about 2/3 of those for men. 
There is another theory-based motivation, also mentioned by A&I, giving 
support to GBT.  In general we want to tax the exogenous endowment of people, i.e. the 
amount of inborn resources (ability, say) that ultimately allow people to attain a certain 
level of income and welfare. Since the endowment is not directly observable, we 
typically tax income, which is observable and correlated with the endowment. However 
income is endogenous, i.e. it depends on people’s decisions. This creates an incentive 
for people to “hide” their own endowment by producing less income. The theory then 
says that it would be more efficient to tax exogenous characteristics, i.e. something that 
                                                 
1
 Alesina and Ichino (2007). A more complex model is presented in Alesina et al. (2011). 
2
 For Italy see Aaberge et al. (1999, 2002). 
3
 Ramsey (1927). 
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people cannot change and yet is correlated with the endowment.4 Characteristics such as 
age, height and gender might qualify for this purpose. Mankiw and Weinzierl (2010) 
investigate – more as an academic exercise than as a serious proposal – a tax 
differentiated by height and argue that tall taxpayers should be taxed more than short 
taxpayers, based on the empirical evidence upon the positive correlation between height 
and wage rate. Kremer (2002) argues that age is also an exogenous variable that 
contributes to determine individual earnings. Moreover he notes that younger workers 
have larger labour supply elasticities and therefore they should face lower income tax 
rates than older workers.5 Analogously, GBT promises to be more efficient both 
because it implies lower taxes for the more elastic labour supplied by women and 
because it shifts part of the tax burden from an endogenous decision (income) to an 
exogenous characteristic (gender) hypothetically correlated with the productive 
endowment.6 As we will see below, microecometric simulations to a certain extent 
confirm A&I’s expectations regarding the effects of GTB on female participation and 
income. However GTB presents some problems when it comes to the implementation. 
First, the differential in gender-specific labour supply elasticities mostly regards 
married women: single women’s elasticities are more similar to men’s (whether married 
or single). Second, labour supply elasticity is not an exogenous characteristic: it varies 
with the amount of labour, with income level etc. The optimal adjustment of tax rates 
differentials might require a sophisticated fine-tuning and more or less frequent 
changes. More generally, GBT conflicts with a principle of universality that is 
                                                 
4
 A version of this principle is known in the tax literature as “tagging” (Akerlof 1978). 
5
 See also Weinzierl (2011). 
6
 Ichino and Moretti (2009) give an interesting contribution to the analysis of the issue of the correlation 
between gender and productive endowment.  
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intrinsically attached to the institution of personal income taxation: besides being a 
more or less efficient tool to finance public expenditure, income taxation is also viewed 
as a certificate of citizenship. This is a political constraint, not a technical one, but it is 
likely to become important in view of a hypothetical implementation of the GBT 
proposal.7 It is therefore interesting to investigate whether other reforms might bring 
similar benefits to those brought by GBT while avoiding its implementation problems. 
As mentioned above, the idea of gender based taxation is rooted in optimal 
taxation theory. However the same theory contains other and possibly alternative 
arguments that might be competitive in view of the same purposes addressed by gender 
based taxes. In this paper – besides gender based taxes – we will consider two of these 
ideas.  
The first one is again a second-best argument. Labour supply elasticity also 
differs with respect to income: high (low) income people respond less (more) to 
changes in the wage rate.8 Income is endogenous, so the analysis is more complicated 
than with exogenous characteristics such as gender, age or height. However, under 
certain conditions and to a certain extent, the same principle might apply: higher income 
should be taxed more than lower incomes.9 Of course this looks like plain progressive 
taxation, but the motivation here is an efficiency one: so that we end up with the nice 
result that progressive taxation is good both for distributive justice and for efficiency. 
Moreover, since more women than men are likely to belong to low income brackets, a 
                                                 
7
 Differentiated taxes based on height would obviously face the same problem as gender-based taxation. 
Instead age-based taxation might still be judged as consistent with a universality principle, since every 
citizen goes through different ages. 
8
 Aaberge et al. (1999, 2002).  
9
 Diamond and Saez (2011) 
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sufficient degree of progressivity might serve the same purposes of gender based 
taxation although maintaining the character of a universal rule. 
The second recipe might be interpreted as inspired by a first-best optimal 
taxation result, which states that the most efficient policies to redistribute income are 
lump-sum transfers (rather than differential taxes or prices). The policies of Basic 
Income or Guaranteed Minimum Income, especially in their non mean-tested versions 
(Unconditional Basic income, Citizen’s Income etc.), do not exactly implement a lump-
sum transfer but are somehow close to the idea of minimizing the distortions.              
In this paper we evaluate and compare the behavioural and welfare effects of 
various reforms inspired by the ideas of: i) gender based taxation; ii) subsidies on low 
wage rates; (iii) basic income. We use a microeconometric model of labour supply 
(fully described in Colombino 2011) that simulates the choices of an Italian sample 
composed of couple and single households given the budget sets implied by the 
different reforms. The simulation procedure guarantees the fiscal neutrality of the 
reforms and also accounts for the constraints implied by equilibrium on the labour 
market by using a new method specifically appropriate for the microeconometric model 
used (Colombino 2012).  
Section 2 and the Appendix describe the alternative reforms. Section 3 explains 
the simulation procedure and the methodology adopted for the social evaluation of the 
policies. Section 4 illustrates the results and Section 5 contains the concluding remarks.  
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2. The policies 
Theoretical and empirical analyses suggest that the current Italian system of taxation and 
income support is defective with respect to both efficiency goals (e.g. minimizing 
distortions and favouring productive labour mobility) and equity goals (e.g. reducing 
poverty and economic insecurity).10 More specifically, there is evidence that it creates 
distortions unfavourable to female labour market participation (Colonna and Marcassa 
2011). Elsewhere (Aaberge et al. 2004, Colombino 2012) we have analysed various 
possible reforms that promise to be welfare improving as compared to the current system.   
In this note we compare GBT and some of those reforms more specifically from 
the perspective of improving women’s condition. 
Some reforms are specified in terms of a “threshold”G aP N=  where 
N = total number of components of household n; 
( )median 2P C N=
 
= Poverty Line; 
C = total net available income (current) of the household; 
[0,1]a∈  is a “coverage” rate, i.e. what proportion of the poverty line is covered by G. 
For example, G=0.5P 3  means that for a household with 3 components the threshold is 
½ of the Poverty Line times the equivalence scale 3 .11 For the reforms that depend on G 
we simulate three versions with a = 1, 0.75, 0.50.  
                                                 
10
 See for example Onofri (1997), Baldini et al. (2002), Boeri and Perotti (2002) and Sacchi (2005). A first 
microeconometric evaluation of alternative reforms of the Italian tax-transfer system was done by Aaberge 
et al. 2004). In March 2012 the Italian Government has designed a reform of the income support 
institutions, at the moment under discussion by the Parliament. The reform is being declared as inspired by 
more universalistic principles and it contains indeed some moves toward those directions.   
11
 The “square root scale” is one of the equivalence scales commonly used in OECD publications. 
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Gender based taxation (GBT). This is a basic version of the policy proposed by 
A&I. We consider a simplified version of the current tax rule, where the marginal tax 
rates applied to labour earnings are applied to total personal income.12 We then multiply 
the marginal tax rates by two different coefficients τF (for females) and τM (for males), 
with τF < τM, so that the total net tax revenue remains the same as under the current 
system. The result is a gender-specific tax rule. In practice we start from some initial 
values of the coefficients τF and τM and run the microeconometric model that simulates the 
labour supply choices and the total net tax revenue; the process is iterated by adjusting 
the value of the coefficients τF and τM until the public budget constraint is satisfied.13  
Wage Subsidy (WS). Each individual receives a 10% subsidy on the gross hourly 
wage and she/he is not taxed as long as her/his gross income (including the subsidy) does 
not exceed G if single or G/2 if partner in a couple. This policy can be interpreted as 
exploiting the fact that the labour supply elasticities appear to be inversely related to 
household income. In this case, the progressivity of the tax schedule is reinforced by a 
subsidy on low wage rates. The policy is also close to various in-work benefits or tax-
credits reforms introduced for example in the USA (Earned Income Tax Credit), in the 
UK (In-Work Benefits) and in Sweden.14 
Guaranteed Minimum Income (GMI). Each individual receives a transfer equal 
to G – I if single or G/2 – I if partner in a couple provided I < G (or I < G/2), where I 
denotes individual gross income. Taxes are applied to I – G (or I – G/2 ). This is the 
standard conditional (or means-tested) income support mechanism.  
                                                 
12
 In the true current system some incomes (e.g. capital income) are taxed according to a different rule. 
13
 Actually there are many solutions: we choose the one that maximizes the Social Welfare function defined 
in Section 3. 
14
 Many authors have recently analysed or suggested in-work-benefits policies for Italy (Colonna and 
Marcassa 2011, Figari 2011, De Luca et al. 2012)  
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Unconditional Basic Income (UBI). Each individual receives an unconditional 
(untaxed) transfer equal to G if single or G/2 if partner in a couple. It is the basic version 
of the system discussed for example by Van Parijs (1995) and also known in the policy 
debate as “citizen income” or “social dividend” (Meade 1995; Van Trier 1995). Taxes are 
applied to the individual gross income I. 
Last, we also consider policies that combine wage subsidies and transfers: 
GMI&WS and UBI&WS are mixed mechanisms where the GMI or UBI transfer is 
complemented by the wage subsidy WS. For these mixed policies  the threshold G is 
redefined as 0.5G.15 
As with GBT, in all the above policies WS, GMI, UBI, GMI&WS and UBI&WS  
the tax rule  replicates a simplified version of the current system where the labour income 
marginal tax rates (common to both females and males – differently from GBT) are 
applied to the whole income and proportionally adjusted according to a multiplicative 
constant . The parameter  is used in the simulation as a calibrating device in order to 
fulfil the public budget constraint. 
Under the reforms, all the transfers and benefits envisaged by the current system 
are cancelled. Instead the contributions paid toward the current policies remain as a 
source of financing of the new policies. 
A more detailed description of the tax-transfer rules under the various reforms is 
provided in the Appendix and in Colombino (2012). 
 
3. The simulation and evaluation procedure 
                                                 
15
 A mixed system close to GMI+WS has been proposed in Italy by De Vincenti and Paladini (2009). 
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In order to simulate and evaluate the effects of the reforms we use a microeconometric 
model of household labour supply that simulates the new labour supply choices made by 
the households given the new incentives and constraints implied by the different 
hypothetical reforms. The model is similar to the one used in Colombino et al. (2010) and 
it is fully explained in Colombino (2011). The estimation of the model and the policy 
simulations are based on a sample of couple and single households from the Bank-of-
Italy’s Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) for the year 1998.16 Both 
partners of couple households and heads of single households are aged 20 – 55 and are 
wage employed, self-employed, unemployed or inactive (students and disabled are 
excluded). As a result of the above selection criteria we are left with 2955 couples, 366 
single females and 291 single males. 
Each reform defines a new budget constraint for each household. The simulation 
consists of running the model after replacing the current budget constraint with the 
reformed one. The procedure adopted in this paper has two distinctive features that are 
not common in the tax reform literature. First, the reforms are simulated under the 
constraint of being fiscally neutral, i.e. each reform generates the same total net tax 
revenue as the current 1998 system. This requires a two-level simulation procedure. At 
the “low” level, household choices are simulated given the values of the tax-transfer 
parameters. At the “high” level, the tax parameters τ, τF and τM (defined in Section 2) are 
calibrated so that the total net tax revenue remains constant. Second, the simulation is 
conducted under equilibrium conditions for different hypothetical values of the elasticity 
                                                 
16
 More recent surveys are of course available. However, the years following 2000 envisage a more 
turbulent macroeconomic scenario with respect 1998. In any case, the analysis presented in this paper is a 
comparative statics exercise: it concerns the evaluation and design of institutions, i.e. policies that should 
be assumed to stay for a relatively long period; as a counterpart, preferences should be assumed to be 
stable. 
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of the demand for labour. We adopt a procedure that is specifically appropriate for the 
microeconometric model and makes the simulation results consistent with a comparative 
statics interpretation of the results (Colombino 2012).17 The standard procedure adopted 
in tax reform simulation when using microeconometric models of labour supply consists 
of ignoring market equilibrium. When instead equilibrium is taken into account the 
reform induces a new location of the labour supply curve. Therefore a new equilibrium is 
determined by the intersection of the new labour supply curve and the labour demand 
curve (assumed to be unchanged).  The changes in the new equilibrium employment and 
the new equilibrium wage depend on the wage elasticity of labour demand (say η): if η = 
0, employment does not change and the whole effect of the reform is absorbed by a 
change in the wage rate; if η = -∞, the wage rate does not change and the whole effect is 
absorbed by the change in employment; for values of η lower than 0 and greater than -∞, 
both wage rates and  employment change and the closer η is to -∞ the larger will be the 
employment change relative to the wage change. The empirical evidence upon η suggests 
values around -0.5 or -1.0. The results reported here are obtained under the assumption 
that η = -1.18 Besides the 16 alternative reforms we also simulate a tax-transfer system 
that we call S-Current. It is the same true current system, but the tax rule is given a 
simplified representation as in the reforms: namely, we apply the labour income marginal 
                                                 
17
 The procedure adopted here is different from the one proposed by Creedy and Duncan (2005), which 
would not be consistent with the specification of our microeconometric model. 
18
 Simulation results for the policies GMI, UBI, WS, GMI&WS and UBI&WS with η = 0, -0.5, -1.0, -∞, 
are reported in Colombino (2011, 2012). 
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tax rates to the whole personal income, while in the true current system some incomes 
(e.g. capital income) are taxed according to a different rule. Therefore we compare what 
would happen with this system and with the reforms under the same equilibrium 
conditions. We think this procedure is preferable to the standard one consisting of 
comparing the observed status quo to the reforms.19 
For the evaluation of the reforms, besides various behavioural and fiscal effects, 
we also compute the value of the Gini Social Welfare (GSW) function, i.e.:  
(Average Individual Welfare) × (1 – Gini index of the distribution of Individual Welfare). 
Individual Welfare is the money-metric equivalent of the maximum attainable utility 
level as estimated by the microeconometric model.20  
 
4. Results 
Tables 1 – 4 report some results of the simulations. The policies are identified by the 
acronym in the first column. Apart from GBT and S-Current, the other acronyms denote 
the income support mechanism and the coverage parameter as defined in Section 3. For 
example, UBI-75 denotes a policy where the income support mechanism is UBI and G is 
75% of the Poverty line. 
In Table 1 the policies are ranked in descending order (the best one at the top) 
according to the GSW function defined in Section 3. The evaluation concerns the whole 
sample (couples, single females, and single males). Among the five best policies, two 
belong to the UBI type, two belong to the WS type and one (actually the first best) is a 
                                                 
19
 The results reported in Colombino (2011) are in part different from the ones reported here since the 
current system is defined there as the observed status quo. 
20
 More details on the social welfare evaluation procedure are provided by Colombino (2011). See also 
King (1983), Aaberge (2007), Aaberge and Colombino (2011, 2012). The Gini Social Welfare function is 
also analogous to the Sen (1976) Index: (Average Income) × (1 – Gini index of income distribution). 
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mixed type UBI&WS. Table 1 definitely speaks in favour of unconditional universal 
transfers (UBI) or universal subsidies on low wage rates (WS) or – even better – a 
combination of the two principles (UBI&WS).21  
We also note that GBT ranks better than the current system (S-Current) but is 
dominated by the other reforms. This judgement, however, is based on the GSW function 
and concerns the whole sample. The GBT reform focuses on the effects upon women’s 
employment, income and welfare. Tables 2-4 address more specifically GBT’s focus. 
Table 2 ranks the policies according to employment (average annual hours of work). The 
first two columns concern the whole sample and are reported as reference information. 
The other columns concern women’s employment as partners in couples (where WS 
policies are best) or as singles (where GBT ranks first). A&I’s expectations are 
confirmed, although the WS policies obtain very similar results. Overall, the employment 
effects are small. The equilibrium simulation procedure contributes to the modest 
employment effect even with GBT or WS: lower taxes or wage subsidies shift the female   
supply curve to the right, but the labour demand curve pushes down the equilibrium wage 
and moderates the increase in employment. Table 3 (net income) to a large extent 
replicates the ranking of Table 2. A somewhat new result is the large effect of GBT on 
single women’s net income: however, when read together with the small increase in 
employment, this result appears more as a rent rather than an incentive effect. Table 4 
presents the policy rankings according to the percentage of winners (in terms of 
Individual Welfare as defined in Section 3) in the whole sample and among couples and 
single women. GBT performs very well among single women but not so well among 
                                                 
21
 These results are close to what Colonna and Marcassa (2011) find, since their in-work subsidies policy is 
not far from WS or UBI+WS. 
13 
 
couples and in the whole sample (where essentially the same ranking of Table 1 is 
confirmed).  
 
5. Conclusions 
We have used a microeconometric model of household labour supply in order to evaluate, 
with Italian data, the behavioural and welfare effects of gender based taxation as 
compared to other policies based on different optimal taxation principles. This 
comparison is interesting because in our view the main implementation problem with 
GBT is the violation of the universality of personal income taxation. The results give 
support to A&I’s expectations concerning the effects on women’s employment and 
income but we cannot declare an unquestionable success for GBT. First, the employment 
effect is modest. The effect on income is large for single women, but when read together 
with the small employment effect it appears more as a rent than as a reward to effort. 
Second, similar – and in some case even better – effects can be attained by WS policies 
(based on a different kind of tax-subsidy discrimination). Third, when a general social 
welfare evaluation criterion (GSW) is adopted for the whole sample, the best policies 
(UBI&WS, UBI, WS) are universalistic and based on unconditional transfers (UBI) or 
subsidies on low wages (WS) or both (UBI&WS). It might be argued that we might 
obtain even better results with a combination of UBI&WS policies with GBT. However, 
the specific message of the results presented in this paper is that GBT, although 
technically correct, might face “political economy” difficulties not shared by other 
policies that in turn are able to produce comparable benefits.  
14 
 
Two limitations of our analysis must be noted at this point. First, the 
microeconometric model of labour supply adopts a unitary approach, i.e. we assume that 
the household maximizes a utility function that represents the aggregate preferences of all 
the members. This approach implies that we cannot separately identify the welfare gain 
or losses of couples’ female partners. It might then be argued that the gains received from 
GBT by women living in a couple are larger than those suggested by Table 4 according to 
the results on winners among couples. However, the men in the same couples are losers 
due to their higher marginal tax rates and the resources are shared within the couple: if 
the sharing parameter remains close to .5 (as the collective models of household 
behaviour typically estimate22), the welfare level of married women is reasonably 
approximated by the welfare level of couples. It remains true that we are not able to 
identify a possible change in the sharing rule due to a higher level of women’s 
employment and income.23 The second possible limitation concerns the weak 
employment response obtained in the policy simulation. We have already noted how the 
equilibrium simulation contributes to this result. Moreover, our model accounts for the 
quantity constraints faced by the households and – at least in part – the weak supply 
effects might be due to the limited flexibility of the labour market prevailing in the survey 
year (1998). More recent datasets, reflecting a more varied menu of choices on the labour 
market, might produce a somewhat different picture.24  
 
 
  
                                                 
22
 See for example Cherchye et al. (2012). 
23
 We are currently working on a non-unitary model of household labour supply. 
24
 A more complex model estimated on 2008 data is currently under construction. 
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Table 1. Policies ranked according to GSW function. Whole sample. 
GSW gain Net Income 
Employment TMTR 
Winners 
Females Males Females Males 
UBI&WS-75 1248 26496 1007 2042 50.7 69 
UBI-50 1236 26388 1003 2041 51.7 66 
UBI-75 1224 26232 994 2038 55.8 61 
WS-50 1200 26676 1019 2046 47.0 72 
UBI&WS-50 1200 26508 1011 2044 49.7 70 
WS-75 1140 26616 1019 2046 47.0 70 
UBI-100 1140 26040 985 2034 60.4 57 
GMI&WS-50 1068 26496 1011 2045 48.0 68 
GMI&WS-75 1068 26472 1008 2043 48.8 67 
WS-100 1056 26580 1018 2044 48.4 68 
GMI-50 960 26400 1004 2043 46.2 64 
GMI-75 876 26304 995 2041 47.9 58 
UBI&WS-100 852 26220 1000 2038 53.5 57 
GMI&WS-100 852 26304 1003 2041 51.2 60 
GMI-100 612 26076 985 2037 51.8 48 
GBT 96 27012 1017 2046 38.4 46.1 56 
S-Current --- 26772 1010 2047 44.0 --- 
 
Note to Table 1 
 
GWS gain: average annual money-metric gain (computed according to the GWS function) with respect 
to the current system (S-Current) (Euros translated from 1998 Lire). 
 
Net Income: average annual net available income (Euros translated from 1998 Lire). 
 
Employment: average annual hours worked, including zero hours for the non-participants. Annual hours 
are computed by conventionally multiplying weekly hours times 52. 
 
TMTR: top marginal tax rate(s). 
 
Winners: percentage of households whose Individual Welfare (Section 3) increases with respect to the 
current system (S-Current). 
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Table 2. Policies ranked according to women’s employment. 
All  Couples  Single women 
WS-50 1019  WS-50 954  GBT 1545 
WS-75 1019  WS-75 954  WS-100 1544 
WS-100 1017  WS-100 953  WS-50 1544 
GBT 1017  GBT 952  WS-75 1543 
GMI&WS-50 1011  UBI&WS-50 948  S-Current 1540 
UBI&WS-50 1011  GMI&WS-50 948  GMI&WS-50 1525 
S-Current 1010  UBI&WS-75 946  UBI&WS-50 1518 
GMI&WS-75 1008  GMI&WS-75 945.  GMI&WS-75 1514 
UBI&WS-75 1007  S-Current 945  UBI&WS-75 1504 
GMI-50 1004  GMI-50 943  GMI&WS-100 1500 
UBI-50 1003  UBI-50 942  GMI-50 1499 
GMI&WS-100 1003  GMI&WS-100 941  UBI-50 1493 
UBI&WS-100 1000  UBI&WS-100 940  UBI&WS-100 1487 
GMI-75 995  UBI-75 936  GMI-75 1470 
UBI-75 994  GMI-75 936  UBI-75 1466 
UBI-100 985  UBI-100 929  GMI-100 1440 
GMI-100 985  GMI-100 928  UBI-100 1438 
 
Note to Table 2 
Employment: average annual hours worked, including zero hours for the non-participants. Annual hours 
are computed by conventionally multiplying weekly hours times 52. 
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Table 3. Policies ranked according to net income. 
 
All  Couples  Single women 
GBT 27012  WS-75 27744  GBT 24204 
S-Current 26772  WS-50 27720  S-Current 21912 
WS-50 26676  GMI&WS-50 27672  UBI-100 21312 
WS-75 26616  WS-100 27636  UBI-75 20844 
WS-100 26580  UBI&WS-50 27624  UBI&WS-75 20568 
UBI&WS-50 26508  GMI-50 27612  UBI-50 20424 
UBI&WS-75 26496  GMI&WS-75 27588  WS-50 20316 
GMI&WS-50 26496  GBT 27540  UBI&WS-100 20316 
GMI&WS-75 26472  UBI&WS-75 27504  WS-100 20232 
GMI-50 26400  UBI-50 27444  GMI-100 20208 
UBI-50 26388  GMI-75 27444  UBI&WS-50 20052 
GMI-75 26304  GMI&WS-100 27432  GMI&WS-75 19968 
GMI&WS-100 26304  S-Current 27408  GMI-75 19968 
UBI-75 26232  UBI&WS-100 27264  WS-75 19944 
UBI&WS-100 26220  UBI-75 27216  GMI&WS-100 19848 
GMI-100 26076  GMI-100 27180  GMI&WS-50 19680 
UBI-100 26040  UBI-100 26940  GMI-50 19548 
 
Note to Table 3 
Net Income: average annual net available income (Euros translated from 1998 Lire). 
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Table 4. Policies ranked according to the percentage of winners.  
All  Couples  Single women 
WS-50 72  WS-50 87  GBT 96 
WS-75 70  WS-75 86  UBI-100 66 
UBI&WS-50 70  UBI&WS-50 83  UBI-75 55 
UBI&WS-75 69  WS-100 83  GMI-100 47 
WS-100 68  GMI&WS-50 83  UBI&WS-100 42 
GMI&WS-50 68  GMI&WS-75 81  UBI-50 42 
GMI&WS-75 67  UBI&WS-75 80  UBI&WS-75 36 
UBI-50 66  GMI-50 77  GMI-75 35 
GMI-50 64  UBI-50 76  GMI&WS-100 24 
UBI-75 61  GMI&WS-100 70  GMI-50 17 
GMI&WS-100 60  UBI-75 68  UBI&WS-50 16 
GMI-75 58  GMI-75 67  GMI&WS-75 15 
UBI&WS-100 57  UBI&WS-100 64  WS-100 3 
UBI-100 57  UBI-100 61  WS-50 3 
GBT 56  GBT 55  GMI&WS-50 2 
GMI-100 48  GMI-100 53  WS-75 0 
 
Note to Table 4 
Winners: percentage of households whose Individual Welfare (Section 3) increases with respect to the 
current system (S-Current). 
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Appendix 
 
 The reforms 
Tables A1 and A.2 specify net available income as a function of taxable income under the 
reforms. 
Definitions: 
F F Fx w h= = female gross earnings; M M Mx w h= = male gross earnings; F Mx x x= +  
Fy = female unearned gross income; My = male unearned gross income 
m = other household net income 
FS = social security contributions (female); MS = social security contributions (male); F MS S S= +  
F F F FI x y S= + − =   taxable income (female); M M M MI x y S= + − =   taxable income (male); 
F MI I I= +  
P = poverty line  
N = number of people in the household 
G = αP N  with α = 1, 0.75, 0.50 (defined Section 2) 
FC =  net available income (female); MC =  net disposable income (male); F MC m C C= + +  
T = taxes paid by the household 
B = benefits or transfers received by household 
q = average propensity to consumption 
r = average VAT rate  
ω  = proportional subsidy on the gross wage rate  
(.)ϕ = tax rule under the not-gender-based reforms   
(.), (.)F Mϕ ϕ = tax rules under GBT. 
The current marginal tax rates are as follows: 
Income Brackets Marginal Tax Rates 
0 –  7.7 18 
7.7 –  15.5 26 
15.5 –  31 33 
31 – 69.7 39 
> 69.7 45 
Income brackets (originally in Italian Lire) are expressed in thousands of Euros. 
Under the 1998 system the above rates are applied to personal incomes with some exceptions: for 
example capital income is taxed differently. Under the reforms, the income brackets are kept 
unchanged and the marginal tax rates – proportionally adjusted (as explained in Section 3) in 
order to satisfy the public budget constraint – are applied to the whole personal income. The 
current system also envisages deductions, allowances and benefits. Under the reforms (except for 
GBT) all current deductions, tax credits and benefits are cancelled.  
Public Budget Constraint: 11 1 1 0 0 0 0T B r qC S T B r qC S− + + = − + +∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
 
where the superscript R denotes a generic reform and the superscript 0 denotes the current 
system. 
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Table A.1. Net available income as a function of taxable income - Couples 
  
GBT 
( )  current transfers and benefits
( )  current transfer and benefits
F F F
M M M
C I
C I
ϕ
ϕ
= +
= +
GMI 
( )
( )
/ 2 if / 2  
/ 2 / 2  if / 2 
/ 2 if / 2  
/ 2 / 2  if / 2 
F
F
F F
M
M
M M
G I G
C
G I G I G
G I G
C
G I G I G
ϕ
ϕ
≤
=
+ − >
≤
=
+ − >






 
UBI 
/ 2 ( )
/ 2 ( )
F F
M M
C G I
C G I
ϕ
ϕ
= +
= +
 
WS 
( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )
 if / 2
/ 2 / 2 if / 2
 if / 2
/ 2 / 2 if / 2
F F F F
F
F F F F
M M M M
M
M M M M
I x I x G
C
G I x G I x G
I x I x G
C
G I x G I x G
ω ω
ϕ ω ω
ω ω
ϕ ω ω
+ + ≤
=
+ + − + >
+ + ≤
=
+ + − + >






 
GMI+WS 
 
( )
( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )
0.5 / 2 if 0.5 / 2
 if 0.5 / 2 < / 2
/ 2 / 2 if / 2
0.5 / 2 if 0.5 / 2
 if 0.5 / 2 < / 2
/ 2 / 2 if / 2
F F
F F F F F
F F F F
M M
M M M M M
M M M M
G I x G
C I x G I x G
G I x G I x G
G I g G
C I x G I x G
G I x G I x G
ω
ω ω
ϕ ω ω
ω
ω ω
ϕ ω ω
+ ≤
= + + ≤
+ + − + >
+ ≤
= + + ≤
+ + − + >










 
 
UBI+WS 
0.5 / 2 (I )  if  (I ) 0.5 / 2
0.5 / 2 ( ) if  ( ) 0.5 / 2
0.5 / 2 (I )  if  (I ) 0.5 / 2
0.5 / 2 ( ) if  ( ) 0.5 / 2
F F F F
F
F F F F
M M M M
M
M M M M
G wx wx G
C
G I wx I wx G
G wx wx G
C
G I wx I wx G
ϕ
ϕ
+ + + ≤
=
+ + + >
+ + + ≤
=
+ + + >






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Table A.2. Net available income as a function of taxable income - Singles 
 
GBT 
( )  current transfers and benefits
( )  current transfer and benefits
F F F
M M M
C I
C I
ϕ
ϕ
= +
= +
 
GMI ( )
 if   
 if  
G I G
C
G I G I Gϕ
≤
= 
+ − >
 
UBI ( )C G Iϕ= +  
WS 
( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )
 if 
if 
I x I x G
C
G I x G I x G
ω ω
ϕ ω ω
+ + ≤
= 
+ + − + >
 
GMI+WS 
( )
( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )
0.5  if 0.5
 if 0.5  < 
if 
G I x G
C I x G I x G
G I x G I x G
ω
ω ω
ϕ ω ω
 + ≤

= + + ≤

+ + − + >
 
UBI+WS 
0.5 (I )  if  (I ) 0.5
0.5 ( ) if  ( ) 0.5F F F F
G wx wx G
C
G I wx I wx Gϕ
+ + + ≤
= 
+ + + >
 
